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multinational cooperation’.3 The framework was to 
complement cooperation in NATO and the EU.
NORDEFCO was the culmination of a process that 
began in 2007 with the publication of the Norwegian-
Swedish ‘feasibility study’,4 and continued in 2008 with 
the Norwegian-Swedish-Finnish ‘progress report’.5 The 
underlying assumption in these reports was that these 
small countries were no longer able to sustain complete 
and balanced armed forces on their own. The solution was 
to procure the same materiel and trim down each country’s 
national base, support, and logistical structures in favour 
of more integrated solutions. Norway, Sweden, and Finland 
now aimed to cooperate closely on education and training, 
exercises, research and development, procurement of 
equipment, and participation in international operations.6 
This was considered ‘a challenging approach’, demanding 
compromises and trade-offs, but it was argued that this was 
the only way to maintain ‘relevant and sustainable defence 
forces’.7
The approach proved even more difficult than anticipated, 
especially with regard to joint procurement. The Nordic 
countries made failed attempts to acquire a number of 
important equipment systems jointly. When Norway 
cancelled its order for the Swedish-Norwegian Archer artillery 
system in December 2013 – citing delays and technical 
dissatisfaction with the system – it arguably marked the 
end of the ambition of establishing similarly equipped and 
tightly integrated Nordic forces.8
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Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) was originally 
about cost-effectiveness. The Nordic states sought to work 
together when training and educating their soldiers, 
procuring new equipment, and logistically supporting 
their forces. Faced with a relevantly benign security 
situation at home, with Russia regarded in principle as a 
partner, operational military cooperation was primarily 
about expeditionary operations far from northern Europe. 
Even if NORDEFCO never became the beacon of Nordic 
cooperation that some political speeches sought to paint it 
as, it nonetheless provided the Nordics with a flexible and 
non-bureaucratic framework through which various forms of 
defence cooperation could be pursued.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, and the 
subsequent deterioration of Western-Russian relations, 
changed this. NORDEFCO today is much more about meeting 
pressing security challenges in the Nordic region. This policy 
brief explores the potential for further Nordic cooperation. 
What are the opportunities and constraints? The study is 
primarily based on seven recent interviews with civilian 
and military officials,1 as well discussions with independent 
security scholars, from all the Nordic countries except 
Iceland.2
NORDEFCO before Crimea
In December 2009, the Nordic defence ministers established 
NORDEFCO as a cooperative structure by merging three 
existing Nordic frameworks for military cooperation. Its 
primary raison d’être was to ‘produce national military 
capabilities in a more cost-efficient way by means of 
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NORDEFCO after Crimea: ‘A new normality’
All the Nordic states have today come to regard Russia’s 
revisionist challenge to the post-Cold War status quo as 
the greatest challenge to their security. The Nordic states 
generally perceive their security to have deteriorated mainly, 
but not exclusively, due to Russia’s illegal annexation 
of Crimea, military intervention in eastern Ukraine, and 
increasingly aggressive military behaviour.9 In a joint 
op-ed published in 2015, the Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, 
and Finnish ministers of defence and the Icelandic foreign 
minister argued that after Crimea it was ‘no longer business 
as usual’. The Nordic countries were now faced with ‘a new 
normality’.10 The ministers argued that their countries should 
meet this situation with solidarity and enhanced cooperation 
in order to improve their security, complementing NATO 
and the EU. They specified that they should work towards 
being ‘able to act together in a crisis’.11 Since then, Russian 
military activity in the Nordic-Baltic region has continued 
on a high level: Unannounced snap exercises, deployment 
of new weapons systems, and simulated air attacks all have 
contributed to a shared concern for Nordic security and 
stability.   
Main driver of cooperation: The new security situation
It is today a shared opinion among Nordic security 
practitioners that the new security situation faced by 
the Nordic states is – and should be – a key driver for 
contemporary Nordic defence cooperation.12 Since 2014, 
the Nordic states have undertaken several new initiatives to 
address this deteriorated security situation.
NOREFCO has become an important forum for high-level intra-
Nordic security policy dialogue on these developments.13 
The Nordic states have also taken steps to exchange 
information regarding emergency planning and reediness.14 
In June 2016, secure communications via telephone, video 
telephone, and computers were established between the 
Nordic defence ministries and armed forces headquarters.15 
These secure lines of communication allow for more frequent 
and inexpensive day-to-day dialogue. They could also prove 
valuable in managing a fast-moving politico-military crisis 
in the Nordic region. In October 2017, NORDEFCO for the 
first time organised a table top exercise involving senior 
military and defence ministry officials, providing an informal 
setting for discussing simulated scenarios in the Nordic 
region. The aim was to strengthen NORDEFCO as ‘a forum 
for consultations and sharing situational awareness, also in 
a time of crisis’.16
Relations with the US: The pull of the West
Nordic officials stress the importance of strengthening 
transatlantic ties to meet the new security situation. This 
applies equally for militarily non-aligned Sweden and 
Finland and for NATO members Norway and Denmark.17 
Nordic cooperation is not perceived in any country as a 
viable security policy alternative in and of itself, but only as 
a supplement to NATO, the EU, and strong ties with the US. 
This has made Nordic cooperation easier. Nordic cooperation 
can no longer be construed as neutralist, and it serves de 
facto as another vehicle for tying the militarily non-aligned 
countries closer to the US and NATO. 
In practical terms, institutionally, this means having 
Sweden and Finland sign host nation support agreements 
with NATO and join the enhanced opportunities partnership 
of the Alliance. It also means contributing Swedish and 
Finnish troops to the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the 
UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). This in turn aligns 
the Nordic states more closely, since Norway and Denmark 
already participate in these formats.
Strengthening transatlantic ties also means increasing 
US involvement in Nordic exercises. For example, the 
Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish-led Artic Challenge 
Exercise (ACE), which is now one of the largest air exercises 
in Europe – in 2017 it involved more than 1,000 personnel 
and 100 aircraft – has seen a marked increase in US and 
Western participation.18 Recent major national exercises, 
such as Norway’s Cold Response and Sweden’s Exercise 
Aurora 17, have also seen large-scale participation not only 
from the Nordic states but also from the US and a number of 
European NATO states.
Nordic officials generally express satisfaction with training 
and exercises as something which both works well and which 
should be developed further. If they disagree on anything 
with regard to the US, is it perhaps the extent to which the 
‘Nordic family’ should strive to act as a unified block and 
speak with one voice vis-à-vis Washington. While most agree 
that greater unity would give more presence and influence, 
the low-key ‘beauty contest’ to be Washington’s number one 
Nordic ally or partner makes this difficult.
Enduring security policy differences: Limits on 
cooperation
Many of NORDEFCO’s landmark agreements, such as the 
exchange of air surveillance data (NORECAS) and the easy 
access agreement, remain limited to peacetime. This limits 
3their value for enhancing Nordic security.19 Nearly all Nordic 
officials interviewed expressed a strong desire to see the 
NORECAS agreement extended to apply in times of crisis and 
even wartime. However, Swedish and Finnish military non-
alignment, and the Norwegian preference for formal treaty-
enshrined guaranties, has thus far made this difficult.20 
Sweden and Finland have found it somewhat easier to deepen 
their bilateral cooperation ‘beyond peacetime conditions’.21
The alternate landing base agreement is a similar case 
in point. By 2017 all the Nordic states had signed the 
agreement, allowing unarmed aircraft to use each other’s 
air bases, for example in case of poor weather conditions. 
There are currently ongoing discussions to extend the 
agreement to included armed aircraft,22 and there is a 
strong willingness among officials to explore the prospects 
for extending it into crisis and war. This would potentially 
generate important operational benefits, but could become 
politically challenging, particularly for non-aligned Sweden 
and Finland. Norwegian and Danish Quick Reaction Alert 
aircraft are directed by NATO headquarters as part of Alliance 
air policing.
The Nordic states struggle with fear of entrapment and 
abandonment.23 On the one hand, the Nordic NATO states 
worry about making themselves dependent upon these 
arrangements, only to see radar screens go dark and landing 
rights be withdrawn in a crisis. Conversely, Sweden and 
Finland worry about losing their national freedom of action 
to – at least theoretically – keep out of a conflict.24 By 
nevertheless establishing these arrangements in peacetime, 
the Nordic states aim to reap at least some benefits, build 
trust and familiarity, and slowly work towards extending 
them beyond peacetime in the future.
Failed driver of cooperation: Defence economics
Nordic officials unanimously expressed disappointment and 
regret with regard to the poor state of cooperation on the 
joint acquisition of materiel and the joint development 
of military capabilities. When NORDEFCO was established, 
‘significant savings’ were expected to be generated as a result 
of bilateral, trilateral, and Nordic procurement projects and 
joint capability development.25 However, many of these 
projects either did not materialise or resulted in failures.26 
Norwegian-Swedish joint projects proved particularly 
challenging, resulting in some hurt feelings on both sides.27 
To date, the only successful Nordic armament project to 
emerge is an agreement to procure a Nordic Combat Uniform.
There are many reasons for the failed procurement processes. 
Some are legal-bureaucratic: the Nordic countries often 
have different procedures and requirements in terms of 
public tenders, transparency, risk management, repurchase 
agreements, etc. Furthermore, the organisations involved 
are not necessarily equivalent in terms of competencies, 
and decision-making processes may be more cumbersome 
in some countries than in others. On the other end of the 
spectrum are the political obstacles: strategic questions 
related to a potential preference for trade with NATO allies vs. 
a preference to support national industries. Taken together, 
these challenges have often proved insurmountable. 
Increased defence industrial cooperation within the EU, 
including the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), 
could prove a new challenge for non-EU member Norway’s 
cooperation with Sweden and Finland. 
NORDEFCO’s present structure is a legacy from its inception 
at a time when the ambition was ‘system similarity’ by way 
of joint development, acquisition, logistics, and training.28 
Some Nordic officials have suggested revising NORDEFCO’s 
structure to better reflect present day realities. The 
cooperation area (COPA) of ‘armaments’ could, for example, 
be discontinued or amalgamated with that of ‘capabilities’, 
thereby uncluttering and streamlining NORDEFCO. However, 
most argue that the present structure – and the COPAs – has 
established its own traditions and cultures and produces 
some value, that revising the structure would cost resources, 
and that discontinuing or amalgamating COPAs would result 
in little savings. However, all agree that joint procurement is 
not easy and that this area of cooperation has not progressed 
as desired.
Conclusions and recommendations
Nordic defence cooperation is today increasingly about 
cooperating in the Nordic region in peacetime, crisis, and 
war. Although NORDEFCO’s structure was designed in 
a different time, it is sufficiently agile that there is little 
desire to alter it. More use of secure videoconferencing 
(VTC) between the capitals could facilitate more seamless 
‘out of cycle’ decision-making in NORDEFCO and advance 
the dialogue on security policy even further. Building on 
the successful scenario-driven table top exercise – which 
should be repeated – VTC could also be utilised by defence 
ministries and the operational headquarters to practice 
dealing with politico-military incidents in the Nordic-Baltic 
region. Routines for political and military consultations and 
information exchange could be established.
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The Nordic countries should continue working to extend many 
of the agreements and arrangements that now only apply in 
peacetime into times of crisis and war. There is a strong will 
among Nordic officials to move in this direction. Swedish and 
Finnish membership in NATO, unlikely in the short term, would 
make this considerably easier. These countries could then 
take part in planning and preparations for Alliance collective 
defence. Opportunities for new agreements that improve 
cooperation in times of crisis in other areas, for example on 
military or civilian security of supply, should be explored and 
pursued.
Involving the US as well as other key countries – especially the 
UK and Germany – more in Nordic-Baltic security is a shared 
objective for all the Nordic states. These countries are therefore 
regularly invited to take part in Nordic military exercises. As 
far as it is practically possible, the Nordic countries should 
consider also involving these key countries in policy dialogue 
and table top exercises.
There is no desire for a standing NORDEFCO secretariat, which 
would potentially be costly, but the present model of rotational 
chairmanship suffers from limited institutional memory. 
Establishing a shared secure cloud storage for unclassified 
documents – a ‘Nordic Drop Box’ – could be one technical 
solution to improve matters.
Today’s Nordic Defence Cooperation is driven by a shared 
understanding of the increasing regional security challenges, 
a shared interest in jointly meeting them, and a shared 
recognition that the Nordic format can only complement 
cooperation in NATO and the EU and with the US. There is 
also a sense of community and closeness among the Nordic 
countries, and there is broad political and popular support for 
more Nordic cooperation. Security and defence cooperation is 
limited, however, by a factor unlikely to disappear tomorrow, 
namely these countries’ continuing security policy differences 
(NATO membership or military non-alignment).
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